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These contributions to scholarly maritime and policy discourse run deep—but
they are not silent. The lessons that Sea
Power offers should echo around the
globe, like pulses of sonar, ready to be
received and analyzed by an internationally dispersed community of naval
and military strategists in allied and
competitor nation-states. In particular,
the admiral’s clear-eyed warnings and
policy prescriptions regarding China,
Russia, North Korea, Iran, and ISIS are
sure to make waves on distant shores.

autobiographical anecdotes draw from
his fascinating, globe-spanning naval
career that began with service as a surface warfare officer and culminated with
a stint as Supreme Allied Commander
Europe—the first Navy admiral in history to hold this command. The reader
is treated to frequent, self-deprecating
life lessons in leadership, including a
vignette illustrating how a carton of
cigarettes may have determined whether
he ran his ship (and future) aground in
Egyptian waters earlier in his career.

Sea Power is the most recent link in a
chain of American maritime strategy
that connects back to Alfred Thayer
Mahan’s seminal treatises of the 1890s.
Stavridis revisits Mahan’s underappreciated work The Problem of Asia: Its Effect
upon International Politics through a
twenty-first-century lens—its discussion
of a persistent geopolitical choke point
resonates today. In fact, Stavridis invokes
Mahan to articulate an updated case
for an American naval supremacy and
strength that—when closely aligned
with the efforts of allied nations—can
ensure the U.S. Navy’s ability to defend
the homeland, project power, deter
aggression, and maintain open sea-lanes
for global commerce, communications, and freedom of navigation.

Dedicated “to all the sailors at sea,”
Sea Power, like the works of Mahan, is
destined to become required reading
for midshipmen at the U.S. Naval
Academy and the officer candidates in
Naval Reserve Officers’ Training Corps
programs before they embark on careers
in the U.S. Navy. It is no accident that
this admiral has been a mentor to many
men and women who have served
with him in the U.S. Navy “wherever
the wind and waves have taken them,”
buoyed by the wise counsel and
leadership lessons evident in Sea Power.

Notwithstanding Sea Power’s ambitious
subtitle—The History and Geopolitics of
the World’s Oceans—the book should be
comfortably navigable by a broad range
of readers, even those less familiar with
naval history or maritime strategy. As
he did in his earlier book The Accidental
Admiral: A Sailor Takes Command at
NATO (Naval Institute Press, 2014),
the author writes with a dry wit and
an engaging manner, highlighted
by numerous historical insights and
cultural references. Moreover, Stavridis’s
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Outsourcing War: The Just War Tradition in the
Age of Military Privatization, by Amy Eckert.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2016. 183 pages.
$39.95.

In what proves to be both an insightful and informative book, this latest
publication on the just war tradition
integrates the disciplines of applied
ethics, international politics, and
military strategy. As associate professor
of political science at Metropolitan
State University of Denver, Amy Eckert
draws attention to the development of
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private military companies (PMCs) as
nonstate actors in support of warfare. In
this provocative work, Eckert sets out to
detail the phenomenon of the privatization of the military as a paradigm shift
in recent years and its repercussions for
strategic programming. Eckert contextualizes the growth of PMCs within
the evolving history of just war theory
and presents the ethical justification for
war as a dynamic core of principles that
have been reconceptualized and applied
in different time frames. Accordingly,
Eckert proposes a series of qualifications
to the current use of PMCs through a
reformulation of just war principles.
Eckert notes the rapid expansion of
PMCs, contrasting the First Gulf War,
during which the ratio of contractors
to military personnel was one to
fifty, with the later U.S.-led Iraq and
Afghanistan campaigns, in which PMC
contractors outnumbered military
members altogether. The end of the
Cold War, the reluctance of nations to
subsidize large militaries, the lack of
public support for foreign endeavors,
and the trend toward a market ideology
that seeks the cost-effective savings
that private corporations can provide
explain in part the rapid increase of
PMCs within the state’s arsenal of
logistical and operational support.
The advantages of PMCs, as Eckert
outlines, include executive privilege, by
which governments generally can hire
PMCs without congressional oversight,
public debate, or headlines publicizing
casualties or losses; the economic
savings of military outsourcing, which
proponents argue is conducive to fiscal
responsibility and a corporate search
for the lowest costs in a competitive
global market; and deniability, because,
while a government may not be involved
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in kinetic conflict officially, it can
deploy PMCs covertly to accomplish
national security objectives. PMCs,
observes Eckert, offer “maximum
freedom with minimal responsibility.”
However, Eckert highlights a number
of disadvantages of PMCs. Owing to
the private/public divide, corporate
contractors have very little accountability to the states that hire them.
Travesties such as the Abu Ghraib
scandal reflect ethical and legal violations outside the reach of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. High-profile
PMC failures, such as the Blackwater
incidents in Iraq (2005–2007), can
become embarrassing liabilities for
the governments that hire PMCs. The
government lacks control once the PMC
contracts are signed. And PMCs—like
any other private company—act out
of a profit motivation, and are directly
obligated to their corporate shareholders, not the military chain of command.
Consequently, Eckert reformulates
the jus ad bellum (law of going to war)
requirements in ways that address the
role of PMCs. For instance, when a state
deliberates whether to wage a war, policy
makers must evaluate the criterion of
proportionality. That is, even for a war
with a just cause, the potential gains
must outweigh the costs. Eckert argues
that, in contrast with their contemporary
practice, states that hire PMCs must
include the deaths of PMC personnel
in past conflicts in their public records,
then extrapolate from the public records
potential contractor fatalities as a factor
in their calculations of whether, in a
projected pursuit of war, the gains will
outweigh the losses. Equally dramatic in
effect, Eckert recommends that for jus in
bello (the law of conducting war) PMC
employees have the status of “civilian
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combatants,” with both the protections
and restraints implied, and that PMCs,
along with the state governments, have
a shared responsibility to conduct the
war in a way that is consistent with
command and control accountability.
Outsourcing War is a compelling analysis
of the reemergence of nonstate actors
in the implementation of warfare.
With scholarly credibility and political
savvy, Eckert displays an understanding of both the past and the present
as the just war tradition impacts the
future development of PMCs, offering
reasonable solutions to the current
problems posed by the outsourcing of
war. In applying the jus ad bellum and
jus in bello modifications to the status
and conduct of PMCs, Eckert’s central
assertion in Outsourcing War makes us
wonder whether these modifications
negate the very reasons for using
PMCs in the first place. This question
raises even further the critical issue of
whether it is more important to alter
PMC practices to align with just war
principles or to alter just war principles
to align with PMC practices. Eckert
seems to advocate a middle course that
balances the time-honored principles
of the just war tradition with the
reality of contemporary PMC practices
through responsible applications, and
that balance is one for policy makers,
academics, and warfighters to debate
in the outsourcing of war to PMCs.
EDWARD ERWIN
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John Kuehn’s objective is to analyze the
Napoleonic Wars “along principally
operational lines” (p. xi). Kuehn claims
that, of the three levels of war, “the
one that is least understood and
written about resides in that always
uncomfortable middle ground, the
operational level” (p. x). He explains
that he chose the period of the French
Wars (1792–1815) because they lend
themselves “particularly well to an
operational-level analysis” (p. ix). His
goal is to provide “something of an
impressionistic result that suggests the
operational-level approach adopted here
illustrates effectively the more esoteric
concept of operational art—how military
genius, as best defined by Clausewitz,
operated in space and time in the uncertain environment at the operational
level during the era of a veritable ‘God of
War’” (p. xi). In particular, Kuehn, who
holds the General William Stofft Chair
for Historical Research at the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College,
maintains that “an operational examination of Napoleonic campaigns has value
because so many of their characteristics
resemble current American military
thought and practice” (p. 9).
The book begins with an interesting
discussion of the evolution of the
operational art as a level of war to be
studied. Kuehn provides definitions
and an explanation of his methodology,
which is to analyze Napoleonic operations through the frameworks provided
by the Soviet school and by James
Schneider, formerly of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College.
Successive chapters generally follow the
chronology of the coalition wars that
France fought between 1792 and 1815.
Chapter 3, which covers the War of the
Second Coalition, examines Russian and
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